The following is an excerpt from “Faucian Bargain: The Most Powerful and Dangerous Bureaucrat in American History” by Steve Deace and Todd Erzen, published by Post Hill Press.
Experts have expertise you and I don’t have, but they’re not necessarily wiser, nor are they any less sinful. Experts are also wrong all the time, because they’re human, too.
Experts told Admiral Nimitz he was dumb to listen to one Japanese code-breaker and risk much of our remaining Naval fleet on an ambush at Midway, which ended up turning the tide of the Pacific theater in World War II.
Experts told the apostles there’s no such thing as a resurrection. Experts differed mightily with Copernicus and Galileo. We could go on and on.
Plenty of “experts” right now think there are 57 genders, and human life happened because two amino acids formed a single-celled protein 600 million years ago for no reason whatsoever.
Plenty of “experts” also love them some of those open borders that allowed China to export its Wuhan virus to our shores.
Beware of easily handing your sovereignty over to the experts, especially without skeptical vetting. For sure, experts have done amazing things for humanity as well. But a critical time such as this requires more questions, not fewer.
Accountability never made any of us worse. But a lack of it sure does.
Toward the end of his administration, it became obvious President Donald Trump had finally had it with Dr. Anthony Fauci’s antics and exploits. Trump invited Dr. Scott Atlas from Stanford University to join the coronavirus task force, and Atlas took center stage in trying to reset the narrative.
We asked Atlas if he could quantify for us the cost of not seeking wisdom in a multitude of counsel. Of not pitting the best and brightest minds against each other in a zealous pursuit of the truth, no matter what, and instead investing all this power in the hands of one unelected bureaucrat whose will mostly goes unchallenged. Atlas replied:
This has gone on so long that people have lost track of why the original shutdowns were done in the early stages of the pandemic.
In the beginning no one was prepared for a potential case fatality rate of 3.4%, so a short-term shutdown was appropriate to flatten the curve to stop hospitals from being overcrowded so other medical care could go on. It was also appropriate to buy time for the ramping up and procuring of equipment. Though it was rare, there were some hospitals that were overcrowded.
But after the short-term shutdown it got out of hand. Its purpose was not to stop all cases, which isn’t a realistic goal. When you do a lockdown as we have seen all over the world, you do not eliminate the virus. All you do is delay the infection. Then we’re testing asymptomatic people who are in the workforce and shutting down low-risk environments
When you do that, all you are going to do is have these cases come later in the winter. And in the winter you do not have the ability to use social distance, eat outdoors, etc. We’re locking people down in their homes, and the most frequent place where cases are spread are in the home.
Atlas then ran down a potentially tragic list of unintended consequences ...